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The creation of the Arab League in 1945 was the first organized 
action by the Arab states leading to political, social and economic 
integration. Following the establishment of this organization, many 
regional and total Arab unity projects were espoused, particularly the 
Greater Syria Plan of King Abdullah of Jordan, the Fertile Crescent 
Plan of Noree al~Saied of Iraq and the Greater Arab Union Pl9.71 of Nazim 
al-Kodsi of Syria. Those plans had their supporters and opponents. 
None of them actually materialized and, therefore, can not serve as a 
model of political integration. The first unity project in the Arab 
world that did materialize was the union of Syria and Egypt which pro-
duced the United Arab Republic. 
In January, 1958; a group of Syrian military and political elites, 
including members of t~e Ba'ath (Resurrection) party, met with Presi~ 
dent Nasser of Egypt in Cairo and proposed to him the formation of an 
integrated Egyptian-Syrian state. President Nasser agreed, and on Febr 
ruary 22, 1958, Syria and Egypt were joined formally into one state, 
The United Arab Republic. 
Less than foµr years later, despite s~ch redeeming features as the 
common language, the charismatic appeal of President Nasser and the 
common anti-colonial heritage, the union disintegrated when Syria se-
ceded on September 28, 1961, following a successful military coup. 
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The creation of the UAR and its subsequent demise presents a good 
case study for analysis by political scientists, particularly those 
concerned with political integration. There is no doubt that the elites 
in both Syria and Egypt were responsible for the creation and failure 
of the UAR, and the role which those elites played is a legitimate sub-
ject for study and analysis. 
A study of the political elites raises some pertinant questions. 
What is meant by elites? Who are they, and can one locate them? Why 
. 
are we interested in elites in the first place? What role do they play, 
and how crucial is their influence in the integration process? 
This is not a simple task. There is as yet no substantial agree-
ment among scholars on the proper identity of elites. Definitions ad-
vanced to date vary, depending on the perspective of the authors and 
the needs of specific studies. The writers to be discussed briefly in 
this study are, at best, only representative of the principal scholars 
who have espoused and worked on the elitist concept. I can not, there-
fore, claim that the listing is in al;\Y way complete. 
Elites may be few or considerable in number, but they are more mo-
bile and better integrated than the ma~ses. It is they who lead the 
masses and, in so doing, fac:Uitate, oppose or hinder political change. 
This is why several scholars have stressed how elites can be a real ob-
stacle to the achievement of national integration. 
Pareto and Mosca, the two Italian scholars to whom the term "elite" 
owes much of its current popularity, were aware of the fact that, in 
principle, there are as many elites as there are different occupational 
groups. Both recognized the historical and social importance of politi-
cal elites and regarded them as a constant and inevitable feature of 
3 
society, and not simply a passing aspect in human history as others had 
argued. 1 
Harold Lasswell has defined elites as those persons who enjoy the 
greatest proportion of values in a society and get the most of what 
there is to get. Although Lasswell did not indicate whether he was 
primarily concerned with political elites or with all types of elite, 
he nevertheless recognized that the cla'ims of the state are more likely 
to be accepted if they are put forward by elites who can translate them 
l 
into a language the people can understand, and who are influential 
enough to sanctify them. 2 
Suzanne Keller, while emphasizing moral responsibilities in indus-
trial societies, recognizes that political integration must be preceded 
by the reduction of differences and tensions among the elites and the 
modification of their political behavior. To Keller, while all elites 
are important in some social and psychological context, only certain 
strategic elites have a general and sustained social impact and they 
comprise mostly political, military and economic leaders, thus repre-
senting both the unity and internal diversity of society. 3 
Claude Ake has suggested that in the integration process elite 
consensus is invaluable in reducing the political importance of social 
1James H. Meisel,~ ~t%th .2.f. the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and 
the Elite (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1958f,° pp, 240-382; see also Hans L. 
Zetterberg, The Rise and Fall of Elites and Pareto Vilfredo (Totuwa, 
New Jersey, 1968),ChaptersI,II. -
2 Harold D. Lasswel, Politics: Who~~, When, and'~? (New 
York, 1960, pp. 3-29. 
3suzanne Keller, Beyond the Rulirie; Class: Strategic Elites in 
Modern Society (New York, 196"3'T," pp. 4-121. 
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differences and in takin.ig; some qf the fierceness out of political com-
petition. Consensus should be sought, not at the ~rass roots level, 
but at the leadership level, by enlisting the support of leading per-
sonalities from all major social gro1,1ps. This reduces the chances of 
having the government appear to pe the instrument of special interests 
and enhances the government's ability to win popular consensus. 4 
Karl Deutsch's Political Communi t1 and t.he North Atlantic ~, 5 
6 The :tferves £! Government, al?-d,,his "Socii:il 1i'Jobilization and Political 
Development,"7 are perhaps the pivotal wqrks in the field, as there is 
substantial agreement among authors on tpe processes which he has re-
lated. Deutsch's definition of political integration involves insti~ 
tutions and practices, In order tq create a viable nation, one needs 
to have the masses pass through a complex process which Deutsch has 
called social mobilization, the process which integrates them into a 
larger political community. Involving as it does a profound transfor~ 
mation of the social structu~e, Deutsch has postulated that social mo-
bilization breeds tension, uncertainity and anxiety, which may destroy 
the political system unless the elites to whom Deutsch gives key 
4claude Ake,!, Theor;z .2f Political Intee;ration (Homewood, Illinois, 
1967), pp. 60-80. ., ... , . . ' ... 
5Karl W. Deutsch (ed.), Political Community;~ the North Atlantic 
~ (Princeton, 1957), PP• 32-38. · 
6Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York, 1963), pp. 
~ __,' ' 154-160. 
7Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobolization and Political Development," 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 3 (September, 1961), 
pp.· 490-515. ·Professor Deutsch define social mobilization 11 ••• as the 
process of which major clusters of old social, economic and psychologi-
cal commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for 
new patterns of socialization 1:1,nd behavior." p. 494. 
5 
communications and command functions, mai,q.tain the social mobiH.zation 
process by their cooperative efforts. Deutsch believes that the degree 
, of viability of the state must be measured in terms of elite participa-
tion and commitment, through which they give their followers a sense of 
purpose and help them find coherence in the new E;iystem. 8 
Along these same Lines of inqu,iry, Edward Shils prescribes that in 
developing nations the elites are the agents of national integration 
an9- that their support and cooperation hi3-s to be secured.9· One point 
that seems to emerge clearly·from these studi(ils is that the main instru ..... 
ment of integration in new states are the elites and their commitment 
to the new system. Tll.eir coope:ration and participation may do much to 
influence the outcome. 
The major impetus for the union of Syria and Egypt came from the 
Ba'ath party leaders ap.d the younger army officers. It was the support 
of these two groµps µpon which the success of the union had to depend, 
yet. this support failed to materialize. The failure of these elites to 
support the union was reflected by the number of Syrians who resigned 
during the first years of the merger. The more President Nasser pressed 
to get results, the more resistance he encountered from the Syrian 
el:i,tes. In the words of Haykal, the editor of Al-Ahram and a close con-
fi~ent of President Nasser, ''the tJAR co-uJd not fight against the lack 
8Kar], w. Deutsch (ed.), Germaw; Rejoins the Powers: Mass O inion, 
.I.nterest Grou~s, and Elites ~ Contem2ora~y Germc1n Forei~n'"'p'o'Iicy PaXo 
Alto, Ce,lifornia, 1959), Chapt~;rrs II, III. · 
9Ed.ward Shili:i, "The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma: 
Their Bearing on Economic Policy in Underdeveloped Countries," 
World Politics, Vol. 11, No. 1 (October, :J.958), pp. 2-19; see a.J.sci Ed ... 
ward Shils, · .'iThe Intellectual in the Develo:ement of t. he New States," 
World Politics, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Apri~p 1960;, PP• 329-369. 
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of positive action or effort. 1110 
The problem which will be the obj~ct of this study may be stated 
• 
in the following questions. Wh;Y did the early promise of Syrian elite 
support for the UAR fail to materialize? Why was it difficult to orga-
nize Syrian elite support? The investigator suggests the following by~ 
pothesis: The successful integration of developing nations into a vi-
able union requires the active collaboration of the dominant political 
elites of .the merging communities. Given the condition of political 
fragmentation of the Syrian elites, the differences in political matu-
rity and economic development between Syria and Egypt, ~nd the cleav-
ages within the Egyptian elites, the political integration of Syria and 
Egypt was not likely to succeed without coordinated action by the na-
tional elites. When the Syrian elites failed to support the integra-
tion process, the union was doomed. This study will focus primarily on 
the Syrian Ba'ath party elite. 
At the outset. of this study there will be brief mention of the 
political conditions in both Syria and Egypt prior to the union, and a 
brief description of the various pressure1;i--political, ideological and 
historical--~hich influenced and accelerated the formal establishment 
of the UAR in 1958. Chapi;er. II will try to serve this purpose. Chap-· 
ter III will deal with the effects of the political integration process, 
the nature of Ba'athist discontent, the impact which this discontent 
had on inter-elite unity, and the re.perCU$aionson the policy of.com-
munity integration. Chapter IV will describE;J and assess the measures 
10Quoted in Monte Palmer, "The UAR: An Assessment of its Failure," 
The Middle East Journal, Vol. 20, No. l (Winter, 1966), p. 50. 
~ - ' . 
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which were taken to integrate th~ economy and the effects which those 
measures had on Ba'athist alienation toward the union. Chapter V will 
examine the efforts made to integrate the Egyptian and the Syrian mili-
tary establishments and alienation which this produced. The concluding 
chapter will evaluate the UAR integration attempt, its lessons and 
possibilities. 
This study will follow an analytical and historical approach. The 
primary sources of this stµdy are the documents published by the Gov-
ernments of Syria and Egypt such as Mahadir Jalasat Mubahathat al-Wahda 
(Minutes of the Unity Discussions) (Cairo, 1963); Collected s;e.eeches of 
President Nasser; and memoirs written b;y- participants in the Union, 
such as Michel Aflaq's Ma'rakat al-Masir al-Wahid (Struggle of the Com-
mon Destiny) (Damascus, 1963), Muhammed Hasanayn Haykal's Ma Illdhi 
Jara Fi Suriya (What Happened in Syria?) (Cairo, 1962), and Khalil 
Kallas' s Suriya al-Muhattima lH--.Istimar Wal--Diktaturiua (Syria, Crush-
er of Imperialism and Dictatorship) (Damascus, 1962). The secondary 
sources to be used come from the various professional journals concerned 
with the Middle East such as The Arab World, The Middle Eastern Affairs, 
--- --· . 
The Middle East Journal, as well as such newspapers as The New York 
- ... - ' ----
Times, and Al-Ahram. 
The transliteration system applied to the Arabic names used in 
this study is phonetic. The ne,mes are rendered in English as they are 
pronounced in classical Arabic. This is why Nasser will be used in-
stead of Nasir. 
The topic of this study was not a chance selection. It results 
from the writer's personal acquaintance with the area and years of con~ 
cern over and study of the developments which have taken place in the 
8 
Arab world. There is .no doubt that future union attempts in the Arab 
world will benefit g~eatly from the ijAR experience, as whatever has 
happened in Syria and Egypt in the past has always had a significant 
impact on the region as a who.l~:.:~· This thesis is also of special sig-
nificance now, since Libya and Egyp,t are working on a ne.w integration 
de$ign, and L;ibya, Syria anQ. ,Eg;r,pt i;i.re: v~;rins- to prqduce .a,can:t:adera-
tion. Fi:nall;r, th.:i.s stud;y, i:t ,:i.lS h.gped,r wil:l. • contrdbute :to th,e general 
theory of politicaJ. in't;egriation. 
CHAPTER II 
PRESSURE.$ FOR UNION 
While no one has yet determined the exact point in time when the 
seeds of unity with F,gypt were first planted in Syria, it is clear that 
nc;>t until 1955 with the rise to power of the Arab l?eaurrection (Ba'ath) 
party in Syria did the idea of union witll Egypt become popular. 1 
This was clearly expresse~ at a national conference held in June 
1956 and attended by representatives of all the political parties and 
groups in Syria. At that conference sufficient consensus was reached 
to adopt a resolution calling for close economic, political, and cul-
tural cooperation with Egypt, so that these agreements might serve as 
a nucleus for an all-embracing Arab unit1. 2 
In November 1956, the Syrian Parliament passed a reso+ution call-
ing for union with Egypt. 3 The favorable Egyptian response to this 
resolution paved the way for a joint Egyptian-Syrian parliamentary 
session, which was held in Damascus in November of the same year, and 
1on October 20, 1955, an Egyptian-Syrian defense pact was signed 
provided for the setting up of a supreme defense council, a war council, 
and a joint command. Abdel H. Amer, F,gyptian m1nister of war and com~ 
mander in chief, was appointed chief of the joint command. Ba'athist 
Jamal Fa.ysal and Ahmad Abdel Kariin were Syrian represf,3ntatives. See 
The Middle East Journal, Vol. 12, No. 10 (Winter, 1956), p. 78 • 
.___ ~ .·· . 
2The scheme at first aimed at federating the two countries. See 
Fa.yez A. Sayegll, Arab Unit~: ~o~e ~ Fu~fillTent (New York, 1958), 
p. 189. - ., 
3Ibid. 
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which adopted a resolution calling for the unification of Syria and 
Egypt.4 
10 
Negotiations for the union of Syria and Egypt were conducted in 
Cairo during January of 1958. The Syrians, by that time, had come out 
clearly in support of a clear union with Egypt and were now agitating 
for an immediate union.5 Such agitation came primarily from the lead-
ers of the Ba'ath party. The political situation in Syria convinced 
these people tl:).at their only hope for power and stability lay in the 
unification of Syria and Egypt. This feeling was strongly expressed 
by the Ba'ath leaders Akram Hourani, Michel Af'laq, and Salah Bitar, who 
played an active role in the unity discussions of 1958. 6 To fully ap-
preciate the movement towards unity, it will be necessary to examine 
the various pressures that induced both the Syrian and the F..gyptian 
elites to unite and form the UAR in 1958. This study will proceed to 
consider these pressures. 
Ideological Pressur~s 
In his Philosophiz ..?.f the Revolution, 7 President Nasser conceived 
of Egypt as a member and potential leader of three political groupings--
4Ibid., p. 180. 
5The Ba' ath was confident that ,,,,,i_ty would start a chain reaction 
with one Arab state after another joining· the union. For more details 
see Muha.mined H. Haykal, Ma Illdhi :I?·r.§: !,i Suriya (What Happened in 
Syria?) (Cairo, 1962), in Arabic, pp. 16-35. 
6 See "Documents: Mahadir Jalasat Mubahathat Al-Wahda" (Minutes of 
the Unity Discussions) (Cairo, 1963),'"in Arabic, pp. 5-12. 
7oamal A. Nasser, Philos~~~ of the Revolution (New York, 1959), 
pp. 59-62. 
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the Arab states, the African states and th~ Muslim states. He had dif-
ficulties with two of these groups of states, name~y the Afrioan and 
the Muslim, which proved to be opportunistic. This became clear when 
many Africans and Muslims willingly cooperated with Israel. 8 President 
Nasser, therefore, concentrated his efforts <l:>n the sphere of Arab unity. 
The Czechoslovak arms deal in 1955 and the successful nationalization 
of the Suez Canal in 1956 gave President Nasser newly realized power. 
He had emerged as the new Saladin of the Arab world, and from that time 
on he began to speak of Arab uni ty.·9 In January 1956, Egypt proclaimed 
a new constitution which stated that Egypt was part of a greater Arab 
nation and was aware of its obligations and responsibilities in the com-
10 
mon Arab struggle. During the same year, Egypt started an extensive 
radio propaganda campaign calling fo:ri Arab u:q.ity. 11 In 1957, when Sy-
ria was facing a threat from Turkey and the West over the regime of 
Colonel Abdel Hamed Serraj in Syria, Nasser was quick to despatch a 
t . t ft t S · · of' 1·d ·t 12 con ingen o roops o yria as a $lgn soi ar1 y. Nasser also 
signed a cultural and defense agreement with Syria during the same 
8 Robert s. John, The Boss: ~h.e Sto.r;x: $£. Gama.l Abdel Nasser (New 
York, 1960), pp. 268-28"0. ____. 
9Ibid. 
10 Text.of the 1956 Egyptian Constitution may be found in "Documents: 
The New Egyptian Constitution," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3 
(Summer, 1956), PP• 300-306. ·- - · 
11 For more 
Analysis," The 
pp. 98-109.-
details see A. Loya, "Radio Propaganda of the UAR: An 
Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 4 (April, 1962), 
. -
12SaJ-egh, ~ Unity, p. 173. 
12 
year. 13 
In Syria, the rise to power during 1955-1956 of the Arab Resurrec-
tion (Ba'ath) party and its whole~hearted support of Nasser created a 
strong ideological pressure for unity. According to Ba'athist doctrine, 
Western democracy, traditional Islam, and Marxist communism had failed 
to solve adequately the problems of the Arab world, and the only solu- . 
tion left was the Ba'athist philosophy, a fusion of socialism and Arab 
nationalism. In his book F'i Sabil al-Ba' ath (For the sake of Resurrec-
- ' ' I 
tion), Michel Aflaq described the,Ba'ath philosophy as follows: 
In its vision of Arab unity Ba'athist socialism envi-
sions bringing together those Arab countries whose 
progress is obstructed bl their lack of capital and 
natural resources with their b!4ter endowed brethern 
who should share their wealth. 
Aflaq also emphasized the unqueness of the Ba'athist message in the 
preamble of the Ba'ath constitution which reads: 
One Arab Nation with an immortal mission, the Arab 
Resurrection Socialist party, a popular national re-
volutionary movement striving for Arab unity, free-
dom an~ socialism.15 
Doubting the ability of the various national parties in the Arab 
states and the ability of the Arab Le~e to be equal to the challenge 
of Arab unity, the Bavath leadership saw a wa:y out in President Nasser. 
To them, Nasser's aniii-western policy, his participation in the Bandung 
conference, the Czechoslovak arms deal in 1955, the successful 
13Ibid., P• ·175. 
l4Quoted in Gordon H. Torrey, "Tl').e Ba' ath: Ideoloey and Practice, 11 
~ Middle East Journal, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Autumn, 1969), p. 451. 
l5For Translation of the Ba'ath Constitution see Leonard Binder, 
"Constitution of the Ari:tb Ressurection (Ba' ath) Socialist part of Syria:" 
The Minrlle F.FJRt Journal, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Spring, 1959), pp. 195-200. 
13 
nationalization of the S~ez Canal, the new Egyptian constit~tion in 
1956, and the F.gyptian radio clamor for Arab unity were all indications 
of Nasser's pan-Arab policy. This is how Aflaq summarized his early 
thoughts of President Nasser: 
It is true that the revolution in Egypt did rot fol-
low the same road that the Ba'ath followed ••• but it 
was a true and honest revolution. 
After soll'le tirne it bec;1me st~ble c;1.nd its course 
became clear. There occurred contact and exchanges be-
tween Nasser and the movement of al-Ba'ath directly 
and indirectly.16 
Contacts developed between the Ba'ath leadership and President 
Nasser, and the Ba'ath responded with large scale propa~anda in 1956 to 
explain the necessity of union between Syria and Egypt, which s~rved to 
bring the Ba 1 ath still closer to President Nasser. In Aflaq's words: 
Certain conditions obtained in Egypt ••• greater poli-
tical independence, a greater awarenesfil of popular 
needs and aspirations on the part of the leaders ••• 
rendered her better suited to lead the cause.17 
However, had it not 1:?een for subsequent developments which occur-
red in 1957 and early 1958, the union of Syria and Egypt would have 
probably been delayed for many more years. What were the developments 
which hastened the union and broue-ht about the declaration of February 
1, 1958? 
16Michel Aflaq, Nidal ..§,,1·-Ba' ath El Sal;,il a,1"':"Wahda, al-Huri;x;al ~-
Ishtiraki ah (Struggle of the Ba'v ath for Unity, Liberty, arid Sooialisrn) 
Beirut, 1964), p. 12. Writer's verbatum translation. 
17Quoted in P. J. Vatikiotis, "Dile••as of Political Leadership in 
the Arab Middle East: The Case of the UAR, 11 The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Marcll, 196l)i"'p:" 107 •.. · · · 
14 
Political Pressures 
In Egypt, the military revolution of 1952 dissolved all political 
parties and established a National Union to perform the functions of 
the dissolved political partie~. The new constitution, promulgated on 
January 16, 1956, gave major PO¥er to President Nasser, with parliament 
almost wholly subordinated to him. 18 
In Syria, power was diffused and no lead.er was able to win the al-
legiance of all the members of the mil;itant doctrinal parties who had 
infiltrated the army. Since independence, Syria had been involved in 
complicated economic and financial disputes with Lebanon, and in efforts 
to counter the ambitions of the Hashemite r1.1lers of Iraq and Jordan, who 
had sought to include Syria in their e:xpansionistic plans.19 Syria was 
more inclined towards a union with Saudi Arabia or Egypt because the 
Iraqi and Jordanian plans had seriously divided political opinion in-
side Syria. 
From the ethnic standpoint, Syria suffered from diversity and 
fragmentation. The two largest and mo$t important minorities in Syria 
are the Druze and the Alwais who, because of their geographic location, 
18 
"Documents: r.I1he New Egypt;i.an Constitution," p. 300. 
19syria 1 s econom;y is dependent upon the land and nearly three-
quarters of the population are engaged in farming. Land ownership, up 
to 1958, was characterized by large holdings possessed by about fifty 
families namely, KuwattJ..i, Asali, Azim, Bi tar, and Hourani. They also 
controlled the political life ir;t the country. Many of these families 
had strong ties with the neighboring governments, mainly to sell their 
· a,gricultural goods. This in :part explains why political opinion inside 
Syria when it comes to one of the neighboring count:ries, was always 
divided. See Doreen Warriner, Land Reform and D$velopment in the Middle 
East (London~ Royal Institute oflnte:rn'ational Affairs, 1957)-;-I;p. 74-9J:- . 
still excercise inftuence in political life. 20 The Kurds and the 
• 
Christian community also exert a significant role in social and poli-
tical life, although economic wealth is concentrated in the hands of 
th b S . 21 
·. e ur an unni • 
Other minorities are also to be found in Syria. These include Ar-
menians, Circassians, Kurds, and Ass;Yrians. Most of these groups are 
Muslims but .some adhere to other beliefs. They are generally pro-Rus-
sian and suspicious of Arab nationalism. Under the French mandate they 
were favored minorities. The Fren,ch recruited a large number of them 
for the military fcr:ies arid man;y rose to high posts in the Syrian 
22 
army. The Sunni Muslims, mostly landowners, df;lrived their power from 
their early struggle against the french mandate anci from their economic 
standing. 
In March, 1949, Syria had its first D,rmy coup, which ended the 
Sunni hegemon;y and brought the formation of new political parties formed 
20Mai:lJr of their landlords were Sunni Muslims and Cl+ristians. For-
mal education among members of theee two cornmunitie1;3 is almo1;3t lacking 
and their role on the electoral plane was frequently tipping the scale 
of votes. See Gordon H. Torrey, Syr:i~.!2: Po;J.i tics §.:Bd the Military: 
1948-1959 (Columbus, Ohio, 1964), pp. 6~11. 
21The Christian community whieh is about twelve per cent of the 
total population is made up of mostly merchante and shopkeepers who 
resides in the cities. See Akram Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World 
(London, 1947) ,· p. 12. · · · - - ---..-
~iUnlike the Ef.-'Yptian army, the Syrian arrny was not considered 
attractive for man;y members of the country's lea.ding families who saw 
better opportunities in trade and professions. As education spread 
throughout Syria, sons of merchants I peasants, workmen entered the of'.., 
ficer corps. While in thE; Homs military academy many of these officers 
were 'influenced by their instrµ.ctor Colonel Jamal Faysal, Ba'athist. 
Thus, the seeas of the Ba' ath off'icers corps were founded among these 
officers. See Torrey, Syrian Politics, p. 44. 
16 
by the younger generation of Syrians, such as the Sy~ian Socialist 
Nationalist pµ.rty (SSNP), 23 the .A,rab Rei;rnrrection (Ba' ath) party, 24 and 
the Communist party. 25 
Rivalries and the disappointment over the Arab failures against 
Israel precipitated a series of coups that brought the army into poli ... 
tics and the doctrinal political parties into the national struggle. 
In September 1953 1 the Ba'ath and Akram Hourani's Arab Socialist party 
formally amalgamated to become the Arab Socialist (Ba' ath) Resurrrection 
23The SSNP was found.ed in :\.933 by a Lebanese Christian Au tun Sa 1 da. 
The party called for the unity of the Fertile Crescent, the establish-
ment of a pro-Western state in Syria, the overthrow of the feudal land-
holding class, the separation of religion and the state, and the end of 
the influence of' the religious leaders over the government. This met 
with e:x:treme opposition from the S'unni Muslims. After independe:i;ice in 
1946, the party found a real response among students and teachers and. 
its power in Syria greatly increased. See Muhammed Frµ.zat, History of 
Political Parties in Syria (Damascus, 1955), in Arabic, pp. 18-21. 
24Formed by a Qhristian Arab intellectual, Michel Aflaq, the Ba'ath 
derived its power from its insistence on Arab nationalism, its call to 
establish a single Arab state cornprisine all the Arab states from the 
Persian Gulf to the Atlantic, and from its resistance to Western in--
fluenoe. Membership in the Ba'ai;h party has been based on vigorous par-
ticipation and recruitment, but s1,l.pporting non-members and sympathizers 
have also played an important role in strengthening the party. Member-
.ship and active support ce.'ne :from the army officer corps, merchants, 
landowners and teachers. See Ibid., pp, 25 ... 28. 
25The Syrian Communist party, whose real strength was among the 
Kurds, Druzes, and Armenians, was weak for some time because of its as-
sociation with these minorities which discredited it in Arab eyes. 
After the Arab defeat in Palestine in 1948, the party gained wider sup-
port by promoting Syrian unity, capitalizing on the anti-Western feel-
ing, and by opposing the cession of Alexandretta to Turkey. After 1952, 
the party concentrated its efforts among the peasfl,nts. Peasant commit-
ties were formed for carrying out the party objectives of eliminating 
large landowners. In 1954, the Communist leader Khalid Bakdash was 
elected to the Syrian parliament. See Walter Zo Laqueur, Communism~ 
Nationalism in the Middle East (New York, 1956) 1 p. 159. 
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26 party. In 1954, Hourani w~s successful in influencing several power-
ful army officers to organize a pro-~a'ath army grouping under the lea~ 
dership of Colonel Adnan Malki. With army support, the Ba'ath instal-
b . . t 't' 27 led its mem ers in various governmen posi ions. During the same 
year a group of Syrian officers, including the chief of staff, were ar~ 
rested and charged with attempting to bring a pro-Western group to 
28 power. The group of Ba'athist officers were immE1diately promoted and 
Ba'athist influence spread rapidly in the army. 29 Army support was of 
great help in the 1954 elections when the Ba 1 ath won for the first time 
twenty five per cent of' the seats in parliament. The growing influence 
of the Ba'ath picked up momentum in the fall of 1955, when Sabri Asali 
formed a new cabinet and pledged to follow tlle Ba'athist doctrine in 
his internal programs. 30 
26Hourani Socialist were strongest in tlle Homa and Aleppo areas, 
while Aflaq Ba'athists drew their strength from Homs and Damascus mer-
chants, students, and intellectuals. 
27A Ba'athist school teacher was appointed director of government 
lands. A Ba'athist, Wahid Ghanim, WPA appointed minister of health. 
See Walter z. Laqueu:r, "Syria on the Move: Ascendancy of the Left 
Wing," The World Toda;y:, Vol. 13, No. l (January, 1957), PP• 17-26. 
?P. Along with the chief of staff, several officers were arrested 
including the commander of the Aleppo garrison, the commandant of the 
military academy at Homs, and the commander of the armQred brigade at 
Qatana. 
29The army was said to be under the influence of the Ba'athist 
colonel Jamal Faysal, the intelligence chief Abdel Hamed Serraj, a 
close friend of Ba'athist leader Akram Hourani, and Akram Duri of the 
military police. See Haykal, ~ Illdhi, p. 28. 
30rt is reported that .Asali held many cabinet meetings at his home 
so that Ba' a thist leader Hourani, who was not in the cabj.net, could 
attend. For account of' the struggle in Syria see Torrey, Syrian 
Politics, pp. 267-296. 
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In 1955, the s~ruggle ~ntensified in Syria between the Ba'ath and 
its Communist allies and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist party 
(SSNP). 31 The alliance between the Ba'ath and the Communists was ad-
vocated by Akram Hourani as a measure to destroy the pro-Western ele-
ments in Syria. Hourani saw in such alliance a great benefit to the 
Ba'ath, as it could draw on the prestige of the Soviet Union. 32 By 
1955, both parties were preaching anti-Israeli, anti-Western, and pro-
Soviet att,i tudes. 33 The assassination of Ba' athist Adnan Malki, deputy 
chief of staff of the Syrian army, in 1955, by a member of the SSNP 
gave the leftist group their opportunity to liquidate their opponents. 34 
With support and help from the army, ;..11 SSNP members who had not escaped 
to Lebanon were arrested and accused of conspiring with the West. 35 
The party was dissolved, which left the Ba'ath and their Communist allies 
31when the Bagdad paqt was approvedt the Ba'ath and their Commu-
nist allies violently opposed it ai.iu demanded more cooperation with 
the Soviet bloc. The SSNP, on the other hand, favored the ~act and 
supported more cooperation with the West. Haykal, ~ Illdhi, p. 29. 
32Ibid., P• 26. 
33Although the Communist party included about 15,000 members, it 
was the Ba'ath who made the headway. Ba'athists were distributed· 
throughout the government and many officials became fearful of opposing 
the Ba'ath, which cou,ld ro'Q-se the arm;Y or the students against them. 
See The~ York Times, May 10, 1954. p. 3. 
34Malki was assassinated by an arrny sergent who was a member of 
the SSNP at a soccer game at Damascus stadium. 
35The leftist group in Syria charged that the American embassy in 
Damascus was behind the Malki af.fe.ir. In one of their charges they 
stated that the wife of the American. military attache knew of the plot· 
and that she warned Malki three days prior to his assassination. This 
charged was later dropped. See Torrey, Syri~ Politics, pp. 282-289. 
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alone to dominate the political situation in Syria. 36 
After the liquidation of the SSNP, the Ba'ath used every oppor-
tunity to show their influence in Syria and proclaim their solidarity 
with Egypt. On June 2, 1956 1 President Kuwattli accepted the resigna~ 
tion of the cabinet and announced that Lutfi Haffer was his first 
choice as prime minister. The Ba'ath opposed the appointment of Haffer 
on the ground that he was a former SSNP supporter, Haffer was not 
appointed. 37 In 1956, a dispute arose over army matters betwe_en the 
Syrian minister of defense and the chief of staff and the army intel-
ligence chief Abdel Hamed Serraj. 
Although the chief of staff was dismissed, the defense minister's 
attempt to oust Serraj was blocked b~ Ba'athist officers. 38 The Suez 
war of 1956 gave the Ba'ath a major opportunity to demonstrate their 
support for Egypt. Syrian troops under the orders of Serraj destroyed 
m~ pumping stations of the Iraqi Petroleum Company pipeline. A short 
time later, the Ba'ath announced it had uncovered an American plot to 
overthrow the government. 39 Eight members of the Syrian parliament, 
one former deputy, several army officers, and the son of a former 
36on June 29, 1955, one hundred and forty S~ members were in-
dicted. by the militar;r court for instigating _Malki's assassination, 
disturbing Syria's relations with,Egypt, and establishing contact with 
the American embassy. 
l 
37Asali was appointed to lead an eleven-man cabinet of which the 
Ba' ath secured two choice ministries--foreign affairs,- held by Bi tar, 
and economy, held bl Kallas. 
38Haykal., -~ Illdhi, p. 85. 
39The accused were also charged with planning the assassination of 
Serraj, Hourani, Kuwattli, and Ba.k:dash. -
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president were charged with joining in a bond of treason w~th Iraq and 
the West. The verdicts, whichwere pronounced on FebTuary, 1957 indi-
cated the strength of the Ba'ath in securing severe punishment against 
th t . . 1 t 40 e an 1-un1on e emen. 
With the sentencing of the defendents in the Western plot, four 
seats of convicted deputies became vacant. When elections were held in 
March, 1957 to fill these seats, the Ba'ath won three of them. En-
couraged by their victory, the Ba'ath, the Communists, and Serraj formed 
a revolutionary command council, similar to that led by Nasser in Egypt, 
to strengthen their power within the army.41 
While leftist influence was growing rapidly in Syria, the country 
was becoming isolated, except for its close ties with Egypt and the 
42 Soviet bloc. Turkey and Iraq, alarmed over the increasing Soviet in-
fluence in Syria, concentrated troops in May, 1957 a:J.ong their borders 
with Syria. More serious was Hourani's attack on Kings Saud and Hus-
sain in June of the same year for their cooperation with the West. Re-
lations with Lebanon did deteriorate Qver the latter's refusal to allow 
40President of the court was tp.e Communist A.fif Bizri, assisted by 
two Ba'athists. Twelve defendents were sentenced to death, including 
the son of former President Atasi. See~~ York Times, December 27, 
1947, p. 3. 
41The council leadership included Serraj, Bizri, and Hourani. 
Their goal was to maneuver their men in the army into strategic posi-
tions. See The Times I Lonq.011, LTuly 22, 1957, p. 4. 
42During 1956, following Egypt's example, there was a growing 
warmth in Syria-Soviet block relations, In addition to the arms a:q.d 
economic agreements, President Kuwattli was the first Arab head of 
state to pay an official visit to th~ Soviet Union. Ir~ 1956, Syria 
recognized Red China. 
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extradition of Syrian escapees in the Iraqi plot,43 
On August 13, ·1957, radio Damascus announced that the army had un-
covered an American plot to overthrow the Syrian government. 44 The 
plot provided the Ba'ath and their allies with just the excuse they 
needed to oust from the army the last remnants of opposition. Many of-
ficers were ousted and replaced by leftists.45 When the arm;r chief of 
staff refused to sign these orders, .he was dismissed. 46 
What had appeared to be a small plot expanded into a serious in-
ternational crisis. 4 7 '11hree members of the American embassy. at Damascus 
were expelled and a war-scare crisis developed in the wake of troop 
43saud and Hussain had many sympathizers in Syria, including 
President Kuwattli. See The Times, London, July 22, 1957, p. 4. 
-·- ' 
44syria charged that the plot was planned by the American m;i,litary 
attache in Damascus, several army officers, and pro-Western elements in 
Syria. See International Affairs, Vol. 36 1 No. l (Januar;y, 1960), 
p. 20~ 
45Ba'athist Jamal Faysal was put in command of the gendamerie, 
among those omrted were the inspector general of the ar1ny, the commander 
of the Homs military academy, and the commander of the Israeli front. 
46He was replaced by Communist Afif Bizri who was promoted to 
general. See The Middle East Forum, Vol. 36, No. 8 ( October, 1959), 
------ .....,..__ --·~-P• 40. 
47on September 9, 1957, Nasser stated that Egypt would give Syria 
uniimited support. On September 12, Nasser presided over a top-level 
military conference between Egyptian and Syrian military chiefs in 
Cairo. The meeting placed the two armies under joint command led by 
AbdEll Makem Amer Egyptian chief of staff. See The Times, London, 
August 23, 1957, p •. 3. -- , 
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concentrations on the Turkish-Syrian borders. 48 
It was at this point that the Ba'ath leaders realized that to al-
low the situation to deteriorate further would only lead to a civil war. 
With Soviet prestige, the Syrian Communist party was gathering adhe-
rents so rapidly that the Ba'ath realized it was impossible for them 
to. maintain exclusive control c;1nd that the only beneficiary of such con-
ditions was the Communist party. By the end of 1957, dissension arose 
in the Ba' ath between the resurrection wing, led by AfJ,aq, and Hourani' s 
followers, the socialist faction, over the latter's alliance with the 
Communists and their leaders, Khalid Bakdash and Khalid Azim. Aflaq' s 
followers attacked the alliance with the Communists, alleging that it 
was harmful to the cause of Arab unity. In 1957, after the Communist 
leader, AfifBizri, had become chief of staff of the Syrian army and his 
brother commanded the popular resistl;)J1ce organization, Ba'athist fears 
of Communist power and penE1tration ended the dissention that had exist-
ed between Hourani and Aflaq. Hou.rani's followers became convinced 
that Communist strength was considerable, so they joined Aflaq's fol-
lowers to stop further Communist penetration. The struggl1;3 between the 
48on August 27, 1957, Secretary of State Dulles declared that 
Syria's neighbors were alarmed by the large amount of Soviet influence 
in the area e,nd declared that Prel;iident Eisenhower had responded with 
an arms airlift to Jordan and Irpq. A short time later the Turkish 
army held maneuvers along the Syrian borders. Premier Khrushchev im-
mediately accused the United Strtes of inoiting Turkey to attack Syria 
and warned that his countrywas prepared to use force, if necessary, to 
defend its interest in the area. Dulles denied the oharge and restated. 
his country's obligation under the Eisenhower doctrine to defend Turkey 
if attacked by the Soviet Union. Syria took the matter to the Security 
Council. Later the Council suspended debate on it when king Saud of-
fered his mediation. A short time later, Turkish troops were withdrawn 




Ba'athist Hourani and the Comm1.+nist Azim for the speakership of the 
parliament in 1957 awake:ried the Ba'ath further to the growing Communist 
ascendancy in Syriao 49 By that time tension within Syria was high fol-
lowing clashes between Ba'athists and Communists in the Hama and Aleppo 
areas which left one person dead and twenty four injured. Several peti-
tions were sent to President Kuwattli asking him to stop further Commu-
nist infiltration. After that, several statements were issued by the 
Ba 1 ath leaders attacking the Communists for being o:pporti,mistic.5° 
While the Ba'athists were united in the belief that the Communists 
were the major threat to their ascendancy in Syria, the question was 
how to strengthen the party against its Communist rivals. While there 
had been extensive cooperation between tµe Ba'ath and Serraj against 
the pro-Western elements, the actual extent of Communist penetration 
was not really known. The question could only be answered after a 
final test of strength came about, and then it might be too late. 
There was also the danger that Serraj might seize full control and 
weaken the Ba'ath. 51 Meanwhile, the power of the Communist Azim was 
growing rapidly. He was deputy prime-minister, minister of defense 
49Hourani won the speakership of parliament with Serraj's support~ 
5oAflaq declared that communism is strange to the Arabs, just as 
capitalism is strange to them. On Septembf;lr 12, 1957, Hourani declared 
that the Communist party is insignificant on the Syrian political scene. 
The Ba' ath charged that Communist JJa;rty leader Khalid Bakdash gave away 
secrets to his Israeli comrades when he attended the twentieth commu-
nist party congress in Moscow in 1956. See The Christian Science 
Monitor, September 17, 1957, p. L 
51 See Charles Gallagher, "UAR: The Syrian Region," American Uni-
versities Field Staff, Report, Vol. 8, No. 3, Southwest Asia Series, 
January 30, 1960, p. 2. 
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and finance, and chief of the economic development board. Ba'athists 
were afraid that time was running short, since 1958 was a presidential 
election year in Syria and the only candidate, Khalid Azim, had allied 
himself with the Communist ar!TIY group. Intense competition over the 
$yrian presidency had existed for many years between Azim and President 
Kuwattli, and it was well known that ~uwattli was not running again for 
the presidency in 1958. 52 This added to the Ba'ath's fears and made a 
union with Egypt more imperative. 
This deep fear of Communist penetration, which the Soviets ap-
peared to be supporting, led the Ba'ath leadeTship to the conclusion 
that their potential to remain in power in Syria was weak unless they 
secured the backing of an outside power. Since many of the neighboring 
Arab governments were consider~d by th~ Ba'ath to be imperialist agents, 
a union with an;y of them was out of the question. The Ba'ath officers 
and leadership saw that their 04ly hope for gaining supremacy was 
through a union with Egypt. Nasser's pan-Arab ideology and his stand 
against the Communist party in Egypt, which paralleled the views of the 
Ba'ath, made the Ba'athist leaders feel confident that a union with 
Egypt would eliminate the Communists, their major political opponents 
in Syria, and increase their prestige throughout the Arab world. Ba'-
athist leaders were confident that their strong pro-Nasser stand and 
their pan-Arab ideology, which they shared with Nasser, would help them 
to develop araonolithicBa 1 athist political movement in the united coun~ 
try, and that Nasser would provide the material force the party needed. 
The hopes of the Ba'ath are reflected in the following quotation by 
52Haykal 1 Ma Illdhi, p. 32. 
Aflaq: 
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••• The Ba'ath party hoped, with superficial optimism, 
that unity would result in a decrease of individual rule, 
and that the interaction between the people of the two 
united regions ••• would result in evolution toward de-53 , 
mocracy and away from the rule of a sinele individual. 
Nasser was well aware of the situation in Syria and did not immediately 
welcome the union. He thought that time wa1;1 needed before the idea of 
union could be accepted. 54 In an interview in 1957 with R. K. Karanjia 
of the Indian journal Blitz, Nasser clearly rejected the idea of unity. 
He said: 
I'm not thinking in terms of any federation or con-
federation or such constitutional formulae for the 
present. They will not help our cause so much as 
unity of thought and faith in Arab nationalism will. 
In fact, such constitutional frames can only create 
antagonisms to the Arab ideal and became weapons in 
the hands of our enemies to sabotage the ideal • .Any 
study of history will convince you how paramount Arab 
nationalism and the unity forged by its shining flames 
is to every Arab people. I feel that once foreign 
influences are removed Arab unit;y will follow automa-
tically. All Arab peoples from the Atlantic to the 
Persian Gulf today stand united against the aggressors. 
That is more important to ~e than any plans of confede-
ration or federation. I'm afraid I have not thought 
about any federal or confederal arrangement. I should 
prefer organizations like the Arab League, for instance, 
to become strong and formidable links between Arab 
states.55 
Yet, Nasser's fear that Syria was being driven dangerously by extremist 
elements caused him suddenly to change his mind and accept the proposed 
53Quoted in Monte Palmer, "The UAR; An Assessment of its Failure," 
The Middle East Journal, Vol. 20 1 No. 1 (Winter, 1966), p. 52. 
54~ New~ Times, January 19, 1958, p. 3. 
55"Interview with R. K. Karjana," April 17, 1959, President 
Nasser'e:, S;peeches ~ Press Interviews (Cairo, 1959), p. 536. 
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union.56 There were indications that the power of the ,Communists was 
growing rapidly. Nasser realized that, should they succeed in control-
ling Syria, this could be disastrous to the prestige he had built as 
leader of the pan-Arab movement.57 
I 
The ~ressi:ng circumstances under which the Syrian elites found 
themselves, particularly the Ba'ath leaders and the army officers, who 
were strongly optimistic that a union with E~ypt would be a solution to 
their problems, undoubtedly were the predominant influence that led a 
group of Syrian military and political leaders to fly to Cairo in Jan-
uary 1958 and propose an immediate union. President Nasser agreed, and 
the United Arab·Republic was proclaimed on February 1, 1958 1 subject to 
a plebiscite which was held in Syria and Egypt on February 21, 1958.58 
56Torrey, Syrian Politics, p. 378. 
57Ibid. 
58The conditions of the union were enunciated by Nasser in a 
seventeen-point program given tc the Egyptian national assembly on 
February 5. These included the creation of a 400 man legislative as-
sembly appointed by Nasser in which at least half of the members would 
be from the then existing Syrian and Egyptian legislatures; that exist-
ing Syrian and Egyptian laws would be valid until replaced; the organi-
zation of a separate executive council for each region; and the holding 
of a plebiscite on the proposed union on Feb::r;'Uary 21. Nasser was unani-
mously 'bhosen t.he-;;union' s: first president. See ~ New York ~, :rfal.,, 
2;1., +957, ·p. 1. . ' 
CHAPTER III 
POLITICAL INTEGRATlON,THE BA'ATH 
STRA:ijGER lN THE UAR 
The Syrian Ba'ath party provided the impetus for the union with 
Egypt, while most of the other parties in Syria opposed the union from 
the outset. Alt~ough Ba'ath support of the union was absolutely essen-
"'! 
tial for its successful institutionaiization, discontent grew rapidly 
among the Ea'athist leaders when they became convinced that their ideas 
and goals were not in line with the plans of President Nasser. 
· Ba'athist leaders had hoped that union with Egypt would help them 
to eliminate the Communists, their major political opponent in Syria, 
and spur Nasser to unify the Arab states in accordance with their ide-
ology. Aflaq has related that Nasse:r had expressed his sympathy for 
1 the Ba'ath ideology and goals. The Syrian Ba'ath party needed Nasser 
to provide the political influence to negotiate a union of the Arab 
states, within which the Ba'ath hoped to become the national unifying 
party. 
To President Nasser it was a completely different story. As he 
, saw it, the Ba'ath had asked him for the union and he had agreed in 
1 . 
Michel Aflaq, Ma'rakat al-Masir al-Wahid (Struggle of the Col!lmon 
Destiny) (Damascus, 1963), in Arabic, p. 195. 
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order to save Syria from a civil war. 2 In a speech which he delivered 
soon after the union, Nasser described how the Ba'.ath leaders had begged 
him for an immediate union in 1958. He said: 
To those who then spoke about union, ••• I said pre-
liminary steps are necessary, as union entails great 
difficulties and problems, To this they answered: 
"Where are the objectives you continuously called 
for, do you now repudiate them?" I said, 11 1 do not 
repudiate these objectives, but I would like to feel 
secure about them." They said, "What about Syria, 
will you leave it torn by hatred till it be lost?" 
I answered, 11 to me, Syria is my homeland, my mother- 3 
land, and part of the Arab world in which I believe." 
On March 12 1 1958, President Nasser signed the first deor€es that 
were to apply to both Syria and Egypt. One decree banned all political 
parties and specified prison sentences and, heavy fines should the new 
law be disobeyed. 4 Up to that time (the union came into being February 
22, 1958), the Ba'ath was the only party that was still active in Syria. 
The political opponents of the Ba'ath had a;J..ready been forced to sus-
pend their activities; they, therefore, welcomed the extension of the 
political ban to the Ba'ath. Articles appeared in various Syrian news-
papers asking the central government to put a complete stop to all 
Ba'ath activities. The Ba'ath appealed to Nasser to censure these 
papers, but he refused.5 
2Khalil Kallas, Suriya al-Muhattima lil-Istimar wal-Diktaturiyya 
(Syria, Crusher of Imperialism land Dictatorship) (Damascus, 1962), in 
Arabic, P• 45· 
3Quoted in Monte Palmer, 11The UAR: An Assessment of its Failure,'' 
~Middle~ Journal, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Winter, 1966), p. 52. 
4~ ~~Times, June 10, 1958, p. 1. 
5Ibid. 
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The Ba'ath leaders did not agree to the dissolution of their party 
6 
and made it clear th~t they had no intentio~ to comply. When Nasser 
signed the anti-party decrees in March, 1958, the Ba'ath leaders be-
came disillusioned with Nasser and withdrew their support of the union,7 
A second source of discontent among the Ba'ath leaders was their 
sensitivity to the fact that Egyptians were given the most prestigious 
positions in the union, while the Syrians were limited to secondary 
8 positions which contained neither prestige nor power. 
During the first week of March, 1958, President Nasser promulgated 
the provisional constitution of the UAR, which was based upon the Seven-
teen ~oint frogram that the parliaments of Syria and Egypt had previous-
ly approved.9 He also appointed the central cabinet and the two re-
gional councils. Four vice-presidents were appointed, two of them 
6Ba'ath determination not to submit to dissolution was illustrated 
in the following account of the union negotiations. The Syrian officers 
and Bitar Ba'athist leader met with President Nasser at his home. It 
was at this time, the hour being well past midnight, that Nasser pre-
sented the conditions for unity: a plebiscite, the dissolution of par-
ties, and the withdrawal of the army from politics. The terms were met 
with silence. Nasser.asked Bitar if the Ba'ath was reacly to dissolve 
itself. Bitar replied that he would have to check with the Ba'ath lead-
ers in Syria. For more details see Palm.er, "The UAR," p. 53. 
?The Ba' athists felt that the abolition of their party and the ces-
sation of military intervention in 1iolitics would destro~ political 
life in Syria. For more details see Muhammed H. Haykal, Ma Illdhi Jara 
Fi Suriya (What Happened in Syria?) (Cairo, 1962), in Arabic, p. 90-.-
8 Kallas, Suri;ya al-Muhattima, pp. 45-57· 
9For the text of the UAR Provisional Constitution see Basic Docu-
ments of the Unification of ·che UAR (New York: Arab Information Cen-
ter, 1958-y;-pp~ 10-18. F'or the ~~xt 'of the Seventeen-Point Program 
see Fayez A. Sayegh,~ Unity: Hope~ Fulfillment (New York, 1958) 
pp. 228-230. . 
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Egyptians and the other two Syrians. 10 In the central cabinet there 
was only one Syrian, Salah Bitar (Ba'a.thist), as Minister of state. 
Vice-President Hourani was also named the president of the Syrian execu-
tive council, which consisted of ten ministers, of which only two were 
Ba'a.thists. 11 
The Ba'ath leaders interpreted Nasser's action as evidence that 
he was trying to reduce their influence in the administration of Syria. 
Bitar, who was the Syrian foreign minister at the time of the union, 
had aspired to become the UAR foreign minister. He was. disappointed 
when he was merely given the lesser job of minister. of state. 12 
The dissatisfied Ba'athist leaders sent Aflaq and Bitar to Cairo 
to discuss their grievances with Nasser. As an al terna.ti ve to this un-
acceptable situation, they suggested to the president the formation of 
a six-member state council to decide all state issues, three from each 
region. They further suggested that the th,ree Syrian members were to 
be Aflaq, Bitar and Hourani, all Ba'ath~sts. Nasser turned this down 
and told the Ba'athists that his policy was to involve all political 
groups in the government of the UAR. A council limited to one politi-
' 
cal party, he thought, would only serve to alienate other elements in 
lOThe Egyptians were Abdel Latif Baghdadi and Abdel Hakem Amer, 
who was also minister of war, and the Syrian were Akram Hourani and 
Sabri al-Asali. See ~ Arab World, New York, March 7, 1958, p. 2. 
11The executive council for the Syrian region consisted of Colonel 
Abdel Hamed Serraj, interio~·, Captain Mustafa Hamdon, social affairs 
(Ba'athist), Shawkat Qanawati, municipal and rural affairs, Ahmad al-
Hajj Yunis, agriculture, Khalil Kallas, E!COnomy (Ba'athist), AbdeJ 
Latif Yunis, treasury! General Amin Nafuri, communications, Has.u.. 
Jabara, planning, and Abdel Wahhab Hawmad, justice. Ibid. 
12 Haykal, Ma Illdhi Jara, p. 92. 
31 
Syria against the union.i3 The Ba'athists did not break with Nasser 
at that point. 
In September, 1958, Nasser decided to reorganize the government. 
The Ba'ath leaders gave him a list of twenty na~es, all Ba'athists, 
whom they considered qualified for government positions. Nasser re-
---
jected the list and ol.gain accused the Ba 1 ath of attempting to provoke 
other elements in the union. 14 
In Octobe~ 1 1958, President Nasser reorganized the governmental 
structure. In the new cabinet, seven of the twenty ministers were 
Syrians. 15 Ba'athist leaders were disappointed with the reorganization. 
Hourani lost his position as chairman of the Syrian executive council, 
a job which had given him prestige and direct contact with the Ba'athist 
officers in the Syrian army. 16 As a vice-president of the UAR, Hourani 
had to stay in Cairo, aw.,;y from his base of power in Syria. 
13Ibid. 
l4Arab Political Documents, 1963 (American University of Beirut, 
1963), i;:-i10. 
l5The Syrian ministers in the new central cabinet were Hansan 
Jabara, finance, Faker Kayyali, minister of state, Salah Bitar, nation-,. 
al guidance, General Amin Nafuri, communications, Bashir Azma, health, 
Colonel· Ahmad Abdel Karim, inunicipaJ, and rural affairs, and Akram 
Hourani, Justice. The new Syrian executive council consisted of Nure 
Eddin Khalil, president of the council and minister of public works and 
planning, Abdel Wahhab Hawmad, treasury, Khalil Kallas, economy, Colo-
nel Abdel Hamed Serraj, interior, Captain Mustafa Hamdan, agricultural 
reform, Nuhad Qassem, justice, Ahmad al .... Hajj Yunis, agriculture, To'me 
Awadallah, rural affairs, Abdel Ghani K.a,nnot, social affairs, Riad 
Malki, national guidance, Shawkat Qanawati, health, Muhaml'!led Alam, com-
munications, and Wajib Samman, industry~ For more details about the 
reorganization see !h2. ~ World., New York, November 20, 1958, p. 2. 
16The presidency of the Syrian executive council was given to Nure 
Eddin Khalil, a non-Ba'athist. 
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A third reason for the discontent of the Syrian Ba'ath leaders was 
the fact that they had not been consulted in the decision making pro• 
cess and that Clairo had taken over direction of Syrian regional af ... 
fairs. 17 Toward the end of 1959, Aziz Sidqi the central minister of 
industry, announced a five year plan for the Syrian Region. Syrian ex-
18 perts were not consulted before the issuance of the plan. 
A fourth reason for the dissatisfaction of' the Ba'ath leaders was 
the transfer of a large number of their military followers to Egypt. 
Ba'athist leaders charged that the transfer had been arranged by Abdel 
Hamed Serraj, Syrian·minister of the interior, and Afif Bizri, chief of 
19 staff of the Syrian army. Serraj'e opposition to the Ba'ath was well 
known, and Bizri was considered to be a Communist. Bitar and Hourani 
had earlier asked President Nasser to dismiss Bizri from his post on 
the ground that he was still in contact with the Communists. Insteadi 
Nasser promoted Bizri to full generd and put him in command of the 
20 Syrian First Army. On April 1, l958, a mission of Egyptian officers 
17The following example also shows the distrust which developed 
between the Ba 1 ath and President Nasser" At one meetine; in Syria, 
Nasser suggested that Syria ban the importation of certain goods. 
Khalil Kallas, Syrian minister of economy, a Ba'athist, suggested a 
high tariff on these goods would be more beneficial to the Syrian 
economy than their exclusion. A short time later Kallas was criticized 
by an Egyptian paper for the way he handled the imported goods question. 
Kallas and the Ba'ath leaders then tried to censor that particular 
ii:mue in Syria, but Kallas was summoned to Cairo, where it was made 
clear to him that before any decision could be made in Syria, Cairo 
must be consulted. See '11he New York Times, June 10 7 1958, p. 4. 
_,,......,., .... -~
18 P 1 ''Th u·~R ,. See a mer, e .tl.. , • 
l9"Syria Settles Down, 11 
16, 1958), p. 538. 
1rhe Ec2E;.2.~, Vol. 188, No. 3 (August 
20Haykal, ~ Illdhi ~, pp. 81-83. 
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arrived in Syria and were given important positions within the Syrian 
21 
army. To the Ba'ath leaders, President Nasser was imposing Egyptian 
control over Syria with the support and cooperation of Serraj and Bizri. 
A fifth reason was the Iraqi question. In mid-July, 1958, a revo-
lution occurred in Iraq. Ba'athist leaders in Syria welcomed the Iraqi 
revolt and invited the Iraqis to join the union. Aflaq, the Syrian 
Ba' athist leader, flew to Baghda,d and met with some of the revolt lead-
ers, who welcomed the idea of Iraq joining the union. Aflaq then flew 
to Cairo and told President Nasser that the Iraqi leaders were agitat-
ing for union. Although Nasser we:\,comed the idea, he communicated to 
the Iraqi leaders that more time was needed to study the problem and 
develop adequate plans to enlarge the union. 22 The Syrian Ba'athists 
resented Nasser's ca1J.tion. In a speech on July 22, 1959, President 
Nasser clarified his position: 
From the very beginning we announced that our policy 
toward Iraq was aimed at the establishment of Arab 
solidarity. We also said that our aircraft belonged 
to Iraq and Ir~qi aircraft belong to us.23 
-Strained relations soon developed between Nasser and Premier Abdel 
Karim Qa,ssem of Iraq, and antagonism between the two 11:laders came out 
into the open on March 11, 1959, when Nasser openly charged that Qassem 
was working against Arab nationalism. He accused Qassem of being a 
Communist agent who wanted to "separate Iraq from the Arab people in 
order to annihilate the people in Iraq and trifle with their 
21
~ Arab World, New York, May 5, 1958, p. 2. 
22Haykal, ~ Illdhi .Jara, p. 93. 
23Quoted in Benjamin Shwadran, "The Power Struggle in Iraq," The· 
Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. ll, No. 4 (April, 1960), p. 114. 
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independence and freedom. 1124 
Ba'athist leaders in Syria were extremely critical of Nasser for 
not having accepted the immediate admission of Iraq into the union. 
They accused Na:3ser of having secretly sent Serraj, the Syrian minister 
of interior, to Baghdad in order to repudiate Aflaq's earlier negotia-
tions with the Iraqi revolt le.a~ers. Nasser blamed the Ba'ath for 
undermining relations with Qassem, since it was Aflaq who had first 
visited Baghdad. 25 
A sixth reason was the National Union question. President Na£;1ser 
had demanded as a condition for union with Syria the organization of' a 
Syrian National Union similar• to th&t alread;Y' established in Egypt. 
Ba' athist leaders opposed the creation of the National lJnion and sue-
ceeded in delaying this until the mip.dle of 1959. When it became clear 
that the National Union was going to be establ:i,shed, Ba'athist leaders 
sought to control it through the impending elections. A few weeks be-
fore "the elections, Nassl;lr issued a decree warning the army not to in-
terf'ere in politics; violaters were subje9t to imprisonment from five 
years to life. Over two hundred o:f'ficers who were suspected of Ba' -
athist sympathies were transferred to Egypt, and criticism appeared in 
the Syrian press of Ba'ath party regional activities. 26 Radio Damascus, 
which had been headed by Riad Malki, a B0 'atnist, was put under the 
direction of an F..gyptian. When Jvlalki protested the transfer, he was 
24Ibid., p. 110. 
25Ibid., p. 114. 
26 The Arab World, New York, JunE) 22, 1959, p. 3. 
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asked to resign. 27 Later he was dismissed. Hourani and Bitar, who 
were then in Cairo, asked Nasser for permission to return to Syria to 
campaign for their friends. Nasser turned down the request and ordered 
th t t . C . 28 em o s a:y in airo. Ba'athist leaders interpreted all of these 
incidents as a clear sign of Na.sser's determination to crush their 
power in Syria, so they decided to boycott the National Union elections. 
As Nasser became more and more unhappy with the Ba'ath, his re-
li@nce on Serraj increased. On October 21, 1959, Abdel Hakem Amer, 
vice-president and chief of staff, was a.ppointed governor of Syria. 
The same decree transferred the department of news and propaganda in 
Syria to the administration of Serraj. 29 
Earlier, in Jul.;r, 1958, the Ba'athist goverr,ors of Damascus, 
Aleppo, Homs and Jazirah were dismissed and replaced by non-Ba'athist 
officers following reports of fighting between arrn;Y units in these 
areas. Ba 1athist leaders charged that Serraj was behind their dismis-
sal and that he had alloweo. criticism of the Ba'ath to appear in Syrian 
newspapers. 30 
As Serraj was given. more power.and authority in Syria, Ba'athist 
leaders became convinced. that cooperation. with Nasser was no longer 
possible. The final shock to the Bea,' athists came when a committee was 
appointed to investigate the alle~ed unjust practices of the agrarian 
27Ibid. 
28Ibid., June 29, 1959, P 0 l. 
29Ibid. 
30The ~~Times, July 25, 1958, P• 3. 
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reform minister, Mustafa Hamden, a l3a'athist minist~l', and Abdel Ghani 
K~ot; both submitted their re.sign,ation • .3l The;r were ti;:,ld to meet 
NasseJ;' in Cairo. Hourani and Bitar, who were in Cairo, also submitted 
their resignations in a letter to President Nasser. Nasser accepted 
the Ba'athists' resignations. On January, 1960, he also accepted the 
resignation of Khalil Kallas, the last remaining Ba 1 athist minister in 
his governrnent. 32 
In their letters to Nasser, the Ba 1 athist leaders explained that 
the Ba'ath had struggled for years to bring S;yria into the union with 
Egypt with the understanding that i;hey were not to be expelled from 
power. They were opposed to many of the decisions which had been taken 
in Syria, and which had created an atmosphere in which they could no 
longer cooperate. 33 T):le l3a'ath tried to control the National Union 
but failed, while most of the other parties in Syria,which had dis-
solved themselves in form only, elected delegates to the National 
Union and succeeded in con-:trc:d:ling it. l3a' athist leaders aocused Nasser 
of having personally organized their defeat in the National Union elec-
tions. Nasser practically admitted these charges when he declared in 
October, 1961: 
31 
As a popular organization we formed the National 
Union to act as a frame encircling the conflict be-
tween classes. Our mist~ke was that we allowed.re-
actionary forces not only to join the union but 
also to lead it. These elements managed to paralyze 
its revolutionary ef:t'ectiveness and turned it into an 
organizational front, not motivated by the real demands 




of the people. This mist.9.,ke :i.$ shown by·the :faot 
that some who are le~ding the reactionary seces-
sionist movement in Syria were themselves leading 
the :ijational Union Organization.34 
The resignations of. Hourani, Bitar and Kallas, and the dismissal 
of Malki from the governnient, made it evident that the Ba' ath had ceased 
to have any role in the UAR. The Ba 1 ath leaders were infuriated when 
Nasser accused them of betraying the union. 35 
The appointment of Amer as governor of Syria and the extensive 
authority given to him was a new phm!,se of Nasser's policy of tightening 
his control over Syria. This produced extreme opposition and discon-
te:tJ.t on the part of macy other political figures in Syria, who felt 
that the Egyptians were trying to establish their hegemocy. The Syri,ms 
referred to Amer as tl).e representative of King Nasser in Cairo.36 By 
the end of 1959, two additional Syrian ministers in the central cabi-
net had resigned in protest over .i\rner' s interference with their work. 37 
The two were not Ba'athists, and their resignations were welcomed by 
the Ba'athists because it clearly showed that discontent had spread 
among the Syrians. The most discontented personality, however, was 
Colonel Abdel Hamed Serraj, who had turned over $8,000,000 to Nasser 
which King Saud of Saudi Arabia had sent him as a bribe to destroy the 
union. Serraj had been instrumental in organizing the defeat of the 
34Quoted in Palmer, "The UAR, 11 p. 58. 
35For more details see The Times, London, ,Tanuary 1, 1960, p. 5. 
:---- .---.-,... 
36 · Haykal, ~ Illdhi Jara, p. 76. 
37The two ministers were Qolonel Ahmad /1bdel Karim, municipal and 
rural affairs, and General Amin Naf'uri, communications. 
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Ba' ath in the National Union electicms. Ser:raj !el t that he should 
have been appointed governor of Syria, not Amer, ~nd he openly expres$-
ed his displeasure to both Nasser and Amer. 38 
Serraj objected to many of Ame:r:-'s decisions in Syria, and as the 
conflict between the two intensified \more on this conflict will be 
discussed in Chapter V), President Nassev trciUlsferred Se:rraj to Egypt. 
Serraj later resigned, and two days after his resignation the coup 
occurred. 
In discussing President Nasser's failure in Syria, Patrick Seale 
has written: 
President Nasser's f~i1ure j,n S;r'ria was in the po-
litical sphere, that of statecraft, ••• from first to 
last, his rule in Syria bore the marks of improvisa-
tion and unoert~.in't;t,J, No d1,1ra.ble institutions were 
created and the Syrians were given no clear feeling 
of participation in the running of their own affairs • 
• • • Nasser, autho:ri tarian by temperament ••• felt that 
he could safely rely on none of the pre-union political 
groups. Indeed, his policy appears to have been to 
destroy al\Y center of authority in Syria which mi~ht 
have rivalled his own,. The result was that he was 
left to run a country in which all indi~eno~s political 
leadership had been alienated.39 
3SThe Times, London, February 15, 1960, p. 3. 
-
39Quoted in Pa.trick Seale, "The Break-Up of the UAR," ,T,!l!, World 
Today, Vol. 17, No. 11 (November, 1961), p. 475. 
CHAPTER IV 
ECO~OMIC INTEGRATION 
The union agreement of' 1958 between Egypt and Sy:ria contained a 
significant oMission; it did not prescribe how the two countries were 
to be integratt;id. in the economic field~ What. is more, 1'-fter the es-
tablishment of the union, both Syria and ~ypt retained their own 
currencies, taxation systems, and cµstom ~uties. The budgets ·remained 
separate and newly minted coins were merely stamped with the letters 
UAR. 
Customs duties continued to 1;le levied on trade between the two 
regions, which indicated that the UAR economy was not integrated. 
President Nasser made an effort to integrate certain r;iectors of the 
. economy, but his measures failed and he antago,nized the Ba' ath and the 
Syrian public as well. 
Nasser's plans and policy for economic integration depended upon 
the support of the Ba 1 ath and the other Syrian elites. When this sup ... 
port failed to materialize, economic progress in Syria was stalled. 
The resulting economic stagnation generated bitter discontent among 
Syrian businessmen and the masses, which increased Syrian hostility to 
the union. The year 1957 h!ld been a year of general prosperity in 
Syria. In 1958, however, Syria experienced the first of th:ree consecu-
tive years of severe drouth,which reduced national incor11e by one 
39 
40 
third. 1 The customary ap.nual grain surpluee~, which had stood at al-
most 700,000 tons before the uniqn, disappeared completely after the 
2 
merger. Farmers and businessmen in Syria were unhappy and they blamed 
the UAR, not God or nature. 
Economic progress in Syria was inhibited by decisions which were 
purely political in nature ql,lld which sacrificed economic needs for 
political considerations. Preei~ent Nasser's decision in 1958 to close 
Syria's borders with Lebanon, and with Ir~q in 1959, severely disrupted 
all regular trade patterns that had existe~ between Syria and those 
countries. A comparison of e~port income during the years 1957 to 
1960 shows the extent of the losses which Syria's economy suffered fro~ 
this policy. In 1957, Iraq importedts 28,940,000 of Syrian goods; by 
1960 that figure had dropped to±S 2,530 1 000. Lebanon, which in 1957 
had imported{ S 120,670,000 of Sy:ria;n goods, ;in 1960 out Syrian imports 
to ts 48,840,000. 3 
This policy of isolating Syria from its neighbors a~ienated the 
Syrian merchants, mariy of whom were Ba'athists or Ba'ath supporters, 
cil.Ild increased the illegal export of goods and money. Du.ring 1958 and 
1959 overtS 120,000,000 are.estimat?d t6 have been illegall;y trans-
ferred out of Syria and deposited in foreign b~s; in 196+ alone, it 
is estimated thlil,t between£s 500,000,000 and£s 600 1000 1 000 were 
l Al-Ahram, Cairo, February 21, 1961, p. 1. 
2Ibid., p. 2. 
3rea.r Book of International Traq.e ~ Statistic!;ji, 1960 (New York: 
Uni ted°'"iation, 1962) ,· P• 524. 
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smuggled out of' Syria. 4 All this brought a.bout a serious decline in 
government revenQes and contributed to the failure of the Syrian 
economy during the years of the union. 
Economic development in Syria was also adversely affected by the 
failure of the administrative machinery to effectively coordinate eco-
nomic decisions or to explain their need to the public. When Nasser 
approved a ten-year development plan for the Syrian Region, the lack 
of coordination necessitated import restrictions which tied up exces-
sive amounts of foreign currency, The plan was doomed.5 President 
Nasser later admitted the failures of his administration. 
We have been unable to develop the government machi-
nery to the standard of revolutionary action ••• In 
certain cases, the government machinery was incap-
able of conveying to tge people the new feeling that 
served their intere~t. 
In September, 1958, Nasser promulgated the agrarian reform law, 7 
which was similar to the l.aw adopted in Egypt in 1953. It was cor:-
ceived as an instrument for social, economic and political change. 
Land ownership under this law was limited to a maximum of eighty hec-
tares of non-irrigated land. Landless farmers were to receive eight 
4Monte Palmer, 11Th!9 UAR: An Assessment of its Failure," The 
Middle East Journal, Vol, 20, No. 1 (Winter,· 1966) 1 p. 61. 
-----,..~ 
5President Nasser admitted many times that the Egyptians in gene-
ral had very little information about Syria and the Syrian economy. 
This in l)art explains why it was difficult to coordinate effectively 
and develop a st;rong economic organization. See, for example, Presi-
~ Gamal Abdel Nasser's Sne~~ .§.££ Press Intervie,ws, 1958 (Cadro: 
Dep..,rtment of Information, United Arab Republic, 1959) 1 p. 243. 
6Quoted in Palmer, "The UAR," :p. 62. 
7For the Text of the Agrarian Reform Law see Eva Garzou.zi, "Land 
Reform in Syria," ~ Middle East Jo,;i.rnal, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring, 
1963), PP• 84-90. . 
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hectares of irrigated land, or thirty hectares of non-irrigated land. 
The total area subject to redistribution in accordance with this law 
was estimated at 11 543,635 hectares, of which only six per cent ' 
was irrigated land.: By July, 1961, 670, 212 hectares he,d been e.xpro-
priated, but the area distributed totaled only 175,530 hectares to 
7,306 farmers, of which 148,440 hectares came from expropriated land 
and the rest was state owned land. What is more, of the 175,530 hec-
tares which were distributed, sixty-two :per cent was rainfed, six per 
cent was irrigated land, and the rest was dry farm land. This is im-
portant, since the la,nd reform law was promulgated during the years 
of the severe drouth when the Syrian eoo~omy as a whole was severely 
affected. 8 This wots an ill-ooncei ved ax:1.d poorly timed program that 
did not promote eoonomic integration within the UAR. 
The Syrian agrarian reform law was similar to the Egyptian law, 
which the Egyptians had used to crush the power and infJ,uence of the 
~andowl!l.:iJ;gg, .. C:las-s and to achieve a more equitable distribution of in-
come. 9 Ba 1 athist leaders opposed its application to Syria because of 
the vast differences between Syria, and Egypt. The Ba' ath charged that 
the law failed to take into consideration the various degrees-of irri-
gated a,nd non-~irrigated land in Syria. They pointed out that the 
amount of land to be exprop:riated under the law was much greater in 
8The !~ ~.9rld, New York, November 18, 1959, p. 2. 
9 ( P. J. Vatikiotis 1 Tl_:_S:, ~~£~in foliti_2.§. Bloomington, 
Indiana, 1962), p. 171. 
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Syria, almost sixty per cent of the entire a,gricultural a:r;ea1., compared 
10 to only ten per cent in Egypt, A spokeman later noted that: 
Much unused state Domain land ••• could fi:rst have been 
distributed for the benefit of peasant farmers without 
touching privately owned large estates, and therefore 
without affecting ~he level of agricultural produc-
tivity for a few years.11 
Another unhappy group wag, the landowners, who complained about 
the wa::, th~y were to be compensated for their expropriated land, in 
forty-year bonds bearing one and one half per cent interest, In dis-
cussing the failure of the agrarian reform law in Syria, Eva Garzouzi 
has written: 
In order to achieve its objectives, land reform legi-
slation has had to provide against the reduced pro~ 
duction and increased consumption, as well as the 
higher costs of exploitation, inheren:t in the split-
ting up of large estates into small holdings. In 
Syria, the additional factor which has had to be 
taken into consideration is the m~rginal character 
of some dry farming areas which are not sufficiently 
productive when rainfall is scanty. However, one 
should remember that irr..i?ated land in Syria was only 
about six per cent of the total land distributed ••• 
thus, the percentag19 of the rural population who have 
really benefited from land reform is [sic] still com-
paratively small.12 
The agrarian reform law in Syria and the problems it generated 
highlighted President Nasser's dUemma. While the President underst.ood 
that long range economic measuref. were nece1;Jsary for the social and eco..-
nomic integrati~n of the UAR, he neither made a thoro~gh examination of. 
lOThey also pointed out tha:t the maximum land holding in Egypt 
could produce crops worth EL 8 1 000, while the same area in Syria would 
produoe a quarter of that amount. Por more details see~~, 
London, January 7, 1959, p. 16. 
11Quoted in Vatikiotis, ~ ~ptian ~, p. 171. 
12Garzouzi, 11 La.nd Reform," p. 89. 
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the problems involved nor realized t4e oonsequenqes or the magnitude of 
the BQ'ath hostility. The result was policies which alienated many 
Syrians. 
The same situation was evident in fiscal matters. From the begin-
ning of the union in 1958, Ba'athist leaders had made it clear that it 
was in Syria's interest to keep the Syrian currency separate from that 
of Egypt. The value of the Egyptian pound was lower on the black mar-
ket than its official rate in relation to the S;y-rian pound, and the 
Ba'athists felt that the introduction of a common currency would ad-
versely affect the Syrian pound and the Syrian economy. 13 When it was 
announced in Cairo on October 18, 1958, that by the end of 1959, Syria 
and Egypt would. soon be integrated financially, the value of the Syrian 
pound dropped almost forty per cent. 14 
President Nasser seems to have operated under the belief that he 
could capture the loyalty of the Syrian masses and dispense with Ba'ath 
support. Nasser's long range economic development vians and the in-
troduction of strict economic restrictions only increased resistance 
and discontent among the Syrians. On September 14, 1959, a delegation 
of Syrian merchants and businessmen went to Cairo to discuss with Presi-
dent Nasser the deteriorating economic situation in Syria. The delega-
tion told the President that }Jgypt' s nationalization la.ws and restric·-
tions made sense in Eg7pt because commerce and industry were in the 
l3Khalil Kallas, Sur;i.;x:,:; a,l.,..Muhattima lil Istimar wal-Diktaturiyya 
(Syria, Crusher of lmperialis;;'" and DictatorshiP) (Damascus, 1962), in 
Arabic, P• 23. 
l4The ~ World, New York, June 10, 1959, p. 5. 
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hands of foreigners. In S;yria, commerce and industry were hapdled by 
Syrians whom the government shoulf bave e;n.couraged ;i.p.s'jjead ot try-:i,.ne 'Ii~ 
destro:r?5 .1.'hey openly told Nasser that they had lost faith in his poli-
cies and warned him that illegal i;imu,ggling of money and gooq..s would re-
sult. It is reported that Nasser e~pressed concern to the Syrian dele. 
gation and made a promise to resolve their complaints. 16 Yet nothing 
practical was done. Instead, President Nasser in October, 1959, ap~ 
pointed Abdel Hakem Amer governor of Syria and president of the ~yrian 
executive council. Amer's appointment was a new face in Nasser's 
policy of t:j.ghtening his ~ontroi ove;r Syria1 ancl it brought with it 
increased opposition and discontent from many Syrians. ~;y the end of 
1959, two more Syrian ministers in the central cabinet had resigned in 
protest over Amer's interference with their work. 17 Since they were 
not Ba'athists, their resignations clearly indicated the growing dis~ 
content among many Syrians other than Ba'athists. 
In September, 1960, Nasser clecided to use force ~o integrate the 
economic and financial systems of Syria and Egypt. Serraj was appointed 
president of the Syrian e~ecutive council while retaining his position 
15rt has been recognized that Syria's econom;r has been flourishing 
due to private enterprise. See, for example, The lntepnatio~al Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, ~ Jt)con~m.ic Develo;2ment of Syria 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkin1;3 Press, 1955), p. 23, · 
16 The Arab World, New York, June 10, 1959, P• 5· 
....__,........... '' 
17The two Syrian ministers were Colonel Ahmad Abdel Karim, Munici-
pal and Rural Affairs, and General Amiri N~furi, Communications. For 
more detailli:I see Muhammed H. Ha,yk.a.l, Ma Illdhi Jara Fi Su:t"i;ya (What 
Happened in Syria?) (Cairo, 196;2), ~nArabic, p:-rg~- ' 
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. . t . . . t 18 as Syrian in erior minis er, Rigid enforcement of the 1958 agrarian 
reform law 'by Serraj and his abolition of the special tribal l.egisla-
tion intensified discontent. Several petitions were sent to Nasser de~ 
manding the removal of Serraj and condemning his police methods. 1~ 
Serraj continueq. the policy of restrictions.. In February, 196l, he im-
posed rigid currency and price controls. Merchants and busiµessmen 
were ordered to obtain licenses for all iMports and to se·11 goods. al-
ready ~mported at prices prevailing in September, 1960, or to face 
severe punishment. 20 Izzat Trabulsi, directo~ of the Syrian Central 
' ' 
Bank, resigned in protest, and man;y S;rrian m~rohants and businessmen 
sent petitions to the Syrian minister of econollll;Y protesting the new 
21 import laws and currency regulations, 
The protests and the discontent did not i~press President Nasser. 
In a speech of February, 1961 1 the president publicly supportedSerraj's 
currency policy: 
If the foreign currency with which we are building 
our country is snuggled abroad by those who exploit 
the fruit of our labor and deposit the funds in 
foreign banks, how aha.11 we proceed with the con.,.. 
struction [of our econoll\Y]? Ou.r inoome !ffllst be 
invested inside the coµntry,,.this is the reason 
behind the decree for the reorganiza~~on of foreign 
currency in Northern region [Syria]. 
In July, 1961, (the ninth anniversary of the Egyptian revolution) 
18 The!!:!£ World, New York, January 24, 1961, p. 2. 
l9Ibid. 
20The Middle East Rec9rds, 1991 (American University of Beirut·, 
Beirut,1961), p. 5997' 
21Ibid., P• 600. 
22Quoted in Palmer, "The UAR," p. 66. 
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n~tionalization decrees were issued to complete the process of sociali-
zation and concentrate economic power in the hands of i;he central gov-
ernment. All banks, insurance companies and firms were taken over by 
the state. The maxi~um size of land hol4ings was limited to one hun-
dred acres. Working hours were limited to seven hours a day with no 
reductions in wages. Maximum individual inco~es were limited to 
15, 000 Egyptian pounds a. year, and a quarter of the profit!? of all busi-
nesses were to be distributed to the employees. 23 Although these 
measures generated enthusiasm amo~ the masses, antagonism and opposi-
tion was high among the middle class businessmen, who became the broad 
base of oppo!;!ition to the union. In discussitIB the failure of the 
nationalization decrees in Syria, Monte Palmer has written: 
In Egypt this [nationalization] me~nt government owner-
ship or participation in all sectors of the economy. 
In Syria the number of firms nationalized was far less 
than in Egypt, but the writing was clearly on the 
w ... 11. 24 
The alienation of the ~a'ath produced a host of social economic 
and political problems to President Nasser and jeopardized his policy 
in Syria. Discontent spread from the Ba•athists to the landowners who 
were openly criticizing the agrarian refora law and its method of coa-
pensation. The unending drought made most of the distributed lands 
largely unproductive,and the. goverrulilent was forced to spend more than 
£ S 40,000,000 for relief during the three-year drought. 25 Discontent 
among Syrian businessmen .and merchants was rur;ining so high over the 
23
~ Middle East Records, 1961, pp. 600-602. 
24Pa.lmer, "The UAR," p. 67 • 
25aarzouzi, "Land Reform," :p. 89. 
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government's restrictions of their traditional wa:y of trading with 
neighboring countries that many Syrians left the count~y and smuggled 
their financial resources with thern. This discontent was intensified 
when Amer was appointed governor of Syria, and later, the reliance on 
the strong handed administration Qf Serraj lost the support of other 
key groups. This placed the burden of supporting the UAR mainly on 
Serraj and his supporters in the army, who were themselves unhaPPl 
over Amer's appointri'lent as governor of Syria. From that point on the 
dissolution of the union was si~ply a matter of tiffle, 
CHAPTER V 
MILITARX INTEGRATION 
The union agreement between Syria and Egypt failed to mention how 
the two countries were to be militarily integrated. What is more, 
after the establishment of the union, and as late as 1961, nothing 
practical had been done to 1.1.nify and integrate the ranks, regulations 
and promqtional procedures of' i;he two a:rflllies. The military budgets 
remained separate and, although the U~ identification was added to 
the newly issued arm,y uniforms, the ranks and salaries were not inte-
grated. This indicates that no serious efforts were made to give the 
Syrian officers a strong sense of identity with the union. In 1958, 
President Nasser transferred the Syrian military college to Eg~pt and 
close<;l the other military institutions in Syria. No new military in-
stitutions were created and the $yrian oft'icers felt that they were 
1 being disciplined by Cairo. 
The Syrian .r,,rmy, from its first intervention in politics in 1949 
to the union with Egypt in 1958 1 was always the final arbiter of the 
situation in Syria. The army was also divided into clans and groups, 
l.The general staff of the combined armies excluded almost entirel;y-
Syrian officers. For more details f;)ee Muhammed H. Haykal, Ma Illdhi 
Jara Fi Suri~a (What Happened in Syria?) (Cairo, 1961), in Arabic, 




namely the Communists, Ba'athists, and Serraj's group. 2 Earlier in the 
union, Nasser dismissed and transferred a large numo~~ of the Syrian 
Communist officers to areas in Syria where they could do little or no 
harm to the union. 3 When the Communist commander of the Syrian first 
army, Afif Bizri, objected to these measures and later refused to play 
the role, he was dismissed.4 
Discontent grew rapidly among the Ba'athist officers when they be-
came convinced that their ideas and goals had not been fully accepted 
by President Nasser. The Ba'athist officers believed. that the union 
with Eg;ypt had been founded upon idealistic principles. When Nasser 
made it clear that he had a.greed to the unity treaty only to save Syria 
from a civil war, the Ba' ,:.thist officers resented him and began to feel 
that unity Wlil,S being converted into slavery.5 
During the unity negotiations between Syria and Egypt in January, 
1958, President Nasser had demanded the withdrawal of the Syrian army 
from politics as a condition for unity, ;I:n Haykal's published account 
of the negotiations, the Ba'athists had told the President that Egypt 1 s 
3rn May, 1958 1 forty-three Communist officers were discharged and 
many were given orders to transfer to Egypt. See Ibid., May 5, 1958, 
P• 5· 
4when Bizri was ordered to transfer several Communist ot'f'icers, he 
refused to cooperate and flew to Cs.iro to discuss the matter with Presi·-
dent Nasser. He told the President that he would resign before allow-· 
ing any transfer. Nasser dismissed Bizri from the army for refusal to 
take orders. A short time later Bizri fled to Iraq and published a 
manifesto criticizing Nasser for not living up to the union agreement 
of 1958. See The Arab World, New York, AprH 2'.}, 1;;158, p. 4. See also 
Haykal, ~ Illdhi ~, .,). 81. 
5Khalil Kallas, Suriy.., ~}lhcitU~ lJJ;.;:Lst,imar wal-Diktat~)iyya 
(Syria 1 Crusher of Imperialism and Dictatorship) -(D;;..m~wcus, 1%2 , in 
Ar,ibic, p. 45· 
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anti-party laws and vestrictions made se;nsE;i ir,1, Egypt l;)Elcause the 
Egyptian a.r!To/ lacked a loyii.J. an!i wen O;l"gllUli!?iE34 party. ;In Syria there 
was a well estaplished and O;l"ganized Ba•ath party wh~ch the ~overnment 
shou,ld have encouraged instead of trying to destro;r, Th$y openly told 
Nasser that his policy would destfOY their political powe:r in Syria 
and warned hirn that this would give the a.Ati .... l3a'ath elements an oppor-
tun,ity to group together an<l dest:ro;r the 1+nion. It is :reported that 
Pres;i.dent Nasser 113:ic;p:ressed concern to i}'b.e Syrian ];3a' a thist$. Yet, on 
~arch 12, 1958, Nas~~r e:x;tended the pol.itio&-1 ban to the Ba'ath. 'l1he 
Ba'ath agai;n, appealed to Nasser, but he refuseµ. to heec;l tpeir plea. He 
later adm:\.tted that "disbanding aU po~it!i,.cal parties was a big 
. 6 
mist~e." 
.Anot}ler 1;1ource of discontent aroo~ the Ba'ailh.ist of;fioe:rs was 
their sensitivity to the transfer of a iaFge numper of their group to 
Egypt, 1 The Ba' atp.ist o:f;ficer!ii Sii\W i;n t:tie t;ransfer a ',plpt to undermine 
their position in Syr;i.a. 8 The transfer of eight hundped Egyptian offi-
cers to Syria, during the s~me period, tq take over com~and positions 
throughout i;he Syrian. arrn;y qo~v~n,oed the Ba'athist offi,oers that the 
6Q\loted in Arab Poli tic al :Documents, 1~
1
6} (Al'!lerioan Uni vers:\. ty of 
Beirut, Beirut, .196)L11 p4; '~bi'. .. . . 'r' . . . 
71n M&cy, 1958, over two hundred offioers were put on pension and 
man;y officers from th13 armored d:i,vj,s:i,011 w~re giv1;3n orde;rs to traµsfer 
to Egypt, ~twas reported t~at m~ny of these officers were known for 
their attachment to the :ea•ath party, Seel The Arab World, New York, 
May 5, 1958, p, 4, ...,..._ - .... 
8The moraJ.e of ·the Syrial). offiq~rs in Egypt deterioratEld to a 
point where ~hey reacted 1:?;y !;)ealing of;f the town of Heliopolis, six 
miles outside o:f Cairo. For m<;>re det"'Us SE;ie ,Ar;ab Political Documents, 
l2§J (American UniversH;y of l3ei:ro,t,' l3e1irut, +963), p. 92· ·· · · · · 
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Egyptians had been sent to subordina.t1;i tr,~ S;yri.an f9:pces to Cairo. 
This was reflected by the fol],owi)1€ coml'!lents of the Syrian revolutio-
nary command broadcast of October 21 i961: 
From the first day, we wanted unity to be represented 
by an e~change o;f officers f~om both regions. Our 
you th went, full of vi ta:U ty a.pd Arab ism, to Egypt ••• , 
' What was sent us ;from Egypt? A:U tne evils c;l.nd sins 
committed under the na~e of unity started from this 
point. They sent us o{fioers who took up positions 
in the inte'lligenoe mach;i.:rwry ••• They came to 'Ll,s with 
the mentality of inte:U,igenqe officers and not with 
nationalist spirit with which we faced them, nor with 
Arab brotherliness which in~;Pi::res e:i.noerity aµd confi..,. 
denoe. These peop~e be~ljl,n spread.i~ like octopuses 
into the var:j_ous affa~rs and imposing themselves on 
a.11 occ~sions. They dom;Aated all the sens~tive 
positions in the f'iilst army comlI)and and. the unit com-
mands, while our officers sen~ to ~ypt were just 
filling wooden chairs without au~ho;r;i.ty or power. 9 
Another factor which e~aeerbated the Syrian officers was the 
!:Jtruggle between Abdel Hakem Amer a;nd Al;>de:]. Hamed Serraj. l,,s the power 
of the Ba'~th w~s weakened by Nas~er, he began to rely more and more on 
10 Serraj and his security forces. *n September 1960, Nasser reorga-
nized the executive council in botn regions. 1l Serraj was appointed 
chairman of the Syrian executive cou:i;icil ;and secretary general of the 
National Union while retainine; t4e minist~iee of interio~ and of state. 
Abdel Hakem Amer did not approve the appointment and put strong 
9Qlloted in Patrick Sealj;jl, "The Bre~ .... up of the UAR," The World 
Tod&, Vol. 17, No~ 11 (Nove1,11)er 1 l.9e;il), P• 41~· 
lOSerraj advocrited A. Ptronp- central governmen+, ,r,,, w""' anxious 
to unif;y t.he regimes of the Sy:ri!;l.:q and Egyptian reeionl;l 9 
11For more details about the r~orga~~z~tion see The Arao World, 
-~····· New Xork, September 21, 19qO, p, 3, 
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pressure on Nasser to remove Serraj, 12 Serr~j was aiso critical of 
Amer~ He blamed Amer for delay~ng the integr~tion of the two regions 
and openly condemned Amer's interference in National Union matters, 13 
Serraj also felt that Amer's job was rightfully his, 
President Nasser seems to have sided with Amer. He decided to 
transfer Serraj to Cairo and tried to make the move appear to be aimed 
at appeasing those Syrians who had been qomplaining o:f Serraj's police 
methods, To achieve this, President Nasser, in August, 1960 1 replaced 
the three-cabinet system with a, uni tar;y cabinet in Cairo in which 
Serraj was designated vice.,..president :for internal affairs. 14 Se:rraj 
soon discovered that this was only an honorary position, and less than 
three weeks later he returned to Syria where he called a ~eeting of the 
National Union. At that meeti!lfs, Serraj attacke~ Amer's policy in 
Syria and complained of the bad treatment he had received in Oairo. 15 
Nasser's reaction was to curtail Serraj's power in Syria, Two days 
later he issued a decree that united the t~o committees of the National 
Union and removed Serraj as secretary general of the Syrian Nation;al 
. 16 Union. On September 17, Amer ordered the dismissal of Serraj's 
12In November, 1960 1 Amer interrupted a scheduled tour of the 
Syrian districts ..ind flew to Cairo. It i~ reported that he told Nasser 
that he would not return to Syria unless ~erraj stopped resisting 
orders. See Haykal, 11! Illdhi Jara, p. 107. 
13Ibid., p. 40. 
14Ibid., p. 41. 
l5In Cairo, Serraj became irritated because many of his subordi-
nates were not referring any work to him. Se!'raj was f'urther irritated 
when he was made to wait five days before meeting with Nasser. See 
Ibid., 109. 
16 .. ;[bid, I P• 113. 
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closest intellig-enoe aides and the transfer of maey Syrian officers in 
the armed forces. 17 Cairo then decided to p~tch µpits differenoes 
with the Ba'ath; Amer announced that meetings were taking place with 
the Ba'athists to consolidate the union, However, the Ba'athists re-
18 fused to cooperate with Amer. 
On September 20, 1961, Serraj was recalled to Cairo where Presi ... 
dent Nasser appointed him chairman of the administrative committee of 
the cabinet. 19 On September 26, Serraj resigned in protest. 
Serraj and his supporters had been largely responsible for keeping 
Syria within the union. With his resignation, the last significant 
Syrian support for the union was lost,and two days later the coup oc-
curred. rrhe resignation of Serra.j gave the Syrian officers, who fe1 t 
that their jobs and command were in danger, a reason to group together 
and revolt on September 28, 1961, President Nasser dispatched troops to 
Syria to c:rush the revolt, but later recalled them. This marked the 
end of the union between Syria and E$'Y"Pt and the beginning of the new 
Syrian Arab Republic. 
l7Serraj was disturbed when Colonel Ahmed Huneidi, head of Amer's 
office in Damascus, was appointed minister of the agrarian reform laws. 
He was further disturbed when Nasser united the intelligence services 
of the two regions a.nd abolished the Syrian service of the special." 
bureau which had been directed by Serra.j. Twelve officers who were 
closely associated with Serraj were ordered to report to Cairo. Marwan 
Sibai and Abdel Wahha'b al~ha.teb, who had been Serraj 's closest aides 
were dismissed. See Ibid., p. 115. 
18Ibid. , p. 116. 
19In September, 1961, President Nasserwas reported to have accused 
Serraj of personal ambition.in Syria~ See Ibid., p. 40. 
CH.APTER VI 
CONCLl)SION 
The hypothesis ot this study was that the successful integration 
of separate and distinct political communities having a history of na-
tional independence into a viable unio;ri. requires the active consensus 
and loyalty of the dominant political el~te of each of the merging 
communities. Any failure to enlist the total collabor£tion of the do-
minant political establishments of ~erging national communities is 
likely to doom the union and result in secession and partition. The 
reason for this is that the m&sses are .a,ccu!Stomed to the rule of their 
own political elite in whom they have trust and respect or the habit 
of deference ar).d obedience. The union of distinct national cultures 
is never easy to impose upon the mass population; when it is attempted 
without the wholehearted support of the ruling elite, it generally re-
sults in serious social and political conflict and turbulence. The 
integration of distinct nationd cultune:s must evolve through the 
active partnership of the goverr:1Jng elites who anticipate further 
consolidation of their power ~nd influence from their collaborative 
roles. 
The United Arab Republic, which was established by the merger of 
Egypt and Syria, a.borted because the doll!linant elite group within Syria, 
which had conceived of the union as a me.ans to consolidate its power 
and influence over the Syrian masses, was threatened and revolted to 
55 
56 
defend its political.power. The measu~es whioh were ta.ken by t~e Cairo 
authorities to consolidate Egypti~n hegem9~ over th~ Syrians resulted 
in the alien~tion.of the dominant political elite g~oup within Syria 
and spurred its rebellion. All of the rival political factions within 
Syria, as well as th~ major socio-economic groups, backed the restora-
tion of Syrian independence by the Ba'athist leadership group. There 
was universal consensus in the view that the union of Syria and Egypt 
had been a tr~ic failure. Even Nasser hi111self later concurred in this 
judgment and accepted much of the responsibility for the demise of the 
union when he admitted that: 
We made mistakes. As a result, the national elements 
split up ••• and the reacticinar;r elements grouped. to-
gethe~ ••• disbanding all political parties in Syria 
was a big mistake., •• We should have tried other methods 
in 1958, na•ely, to have disbanded all political par-
ties which did not have our own objectives, and then 
to have organi.3:ed the rest in a common unity of 
objectives ••.• 
The Ba'thists not only had stood initially in the forefront of 
those working for the union with Eg'1l?t, but as Vatikiotis has put it, 
"they provided the necessary support and political machine in Syri~ 
during the first months of the union. 112 Yet the Ba'athists tended to 
project the union in terms of their own ideology, that is, in terms of 
rapid evolution toward parliamentary government and awa:y from the role 
of a single individual, so t:P,e UAR oould attract other Arab st.ates to 
join it and form a union of the Arab states, within which the Ba'ath 
1 Arab Political Docunents ~ 1963 (American Uni versi t;r o.f Beirut, 
Beirut-;--1963), p. 101. · · ·· · . 
2P. J. Vatikiotis, The EQ:;etian ~~Politics (Bloomington, 
Indiana, 1961), p. 168. 
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ho:ped to become the natiol;lal uni:(';yin,g party. Ta achieye these objec-
tivies, Ba'athist leaders advocated~ weak central government which 
would allow Syria to conduct her own affairs without interference from 
Egypt and, in this wa.y, obstructed the political and ideological in-
tegration process, 
As Nasser saw it, the B~'ath was only an instrument to be used to 
govern Syria. When the Ba'athists re:f'used to play their assigned role 1 
he used every possible opportunity to reduce their influence in the 
administration of Syria. To achieve this, Nasser introduced large 
scale economic plans that hurt the Ba'ath and its power base in Syria. 
NaE)ser believed that by these plans he could curtail the powE;lr of the 
Ba'ath and, at the same time, mobilize more support for the union among 
the Syrian urban, business and professional class. These economic 
plans, like the agrarian reform l.aws, were couched ::\.n terms of maximum 
appeal, but the;r failed becRuse they were not sufftoiently clear in 
their value or benefit to the Syrians. They were hardly· a standard 
around which loyalty could be rallied,and they served only to add con-
fusion to the already confused. Syrians. Nasser seems to have over-
looked the fact that the Ba 1 ath had political power that was already 
established and recognized, so his programs could hardly serve to 
generate loyalty without Ba'ath support. 
President Nasser was determined to weaken the Ba'ath by transfer-
ring a large nu,mber of Ba I athist leaders a.nd officers out of key admin-
istrative and military positions and out of Syria. rrhe transfers 
proved to be of limited effica,cy, because Nasf:)er failed to destroy the 
Ba'athist officers corps in Syria. When the coup occurred on September 
28, 1961, Ba'athist officers were in the forefront of it. 
Nasser seems to have believed that, by cooperating with Serraj's police, 
army, and intelligence organizations; he would be able to count upon 
the loyalty of the Syrian masses without the Ba.'ath as intermediaries. 
Serraj was of the opinion that a policy of force would accelerate the 
rapid integration of Syria and Egypt and would make the union more 
meaningful, which explains his policy of rigid enforcement of the 1958 
agrarain reform laws and the abrogation of the special tribal laws. 
Serraj found out that the situation in Syria was unlike that in 
Egypt, where Nasser could depend on an existing military organization 
which was in control of the political life of the countr~. This total 
political control in Egypt had facilitated the implementa-tion of a 
large number of Nasser's programs. In Syria, the Ba'ath party con-
tinued to influence the thinking of a large number of the Syrian army 
officers who were politically opposed to Serraj. 
The role of the Ba'ath in obstructing the UAR integration process 
was definitely a signif'ic.ant and critical variable which supports the 
hypothesis that successful supranational political integration and the 
union of political communities require the active cooperation of the 
dominant political elites. In th~ UAR experience, had the cooperation 
of the Ba'ath been vigorously promoted, the UAR might be in existence 
today and the integrative process might have eventually succeeded. 
When the ·leadership influence of the Ba'ath party was undermined in 
Syria, the.group which had supported unity with Egypt most vigorously 
became the most determined opponent of integration. When Nasser, 
during his disagreement with Serraj a few w~eks before the secession, 
asked Ba' athist leaders to rejoin his government, the latter distrusted 
him; their link with the union had already been broken. 
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The first year of the union wa.s crucial in the integration process. 
When Ba'athist expectations were frustrated, this frustration spread 
to the masses. Syrian loyalty and confidence in the union collapsed 
and prospects of wider union to include other Arab states became a sour 
dream. 
Ha.ve the people of Syria and Egypt and the Aro1.bs in general 
learned from this costly lesson? Muhammed H. Hayke,l, a close confidant 
of Nasser and the editor of Al-,Ahram, in a frank editorioal on June 11, 
1962, gave an interesting assessment of the UAR experiment. Haykal 
wrote that futu:re unity attempts must respect the separate n;,ational 
cultures and elites of the Arab states. National autonomy must remain 
within the union and separate governments should be retained, for "the 
' 
union must be based on the principlef;l of Arab socialism and de111ocrac_y. 113 
The leaders of Syria, Egypt, and Libya have been working out a new 
integr~tion proposal. Egypt and Libya have already signed an agreement 
for a union to be completed by September 1973. Having understood the 
lessons of the UAR, the two governments have been planning more care-
fully the eventual integration of their la,ws, economies, and 
institutions. 
This thesis has been written under several limitations. Accurate 
published information on the inner workings of the United Arab Republic 
is still laokirig. Official documents have not been relea.sed,and the 
thesis had to depend on the diaries and memoirs of participants, whose 
historical accuracy cannot yet be establi13hed. Possibly, oral 
3Quoted in Gordon H. Torrey, §yri!!-.12: Politics-~ the Milit<ir;z: 
t948-1-1.2.§ (Columbus, Ohio, 1964), p. 401. 
interviews with the participants in the union who are still living 
could have produced more data, but this w&i.s lirn:i.ted by the nature 
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of the study and the problem of distance, The fact that most published 
informa,tion is in the Arabic language also presented the problem of 
proper trMslation to give the exact meaning of the sources. Quota-
tions which were taken from English texts also proved to be poor· 
translations. 
It is hoped that this thesis has made some modest contribution to 
the study of politic<i!.1 integration through this case study of how 
elites exert a major role in the integration process. 
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